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A CENTRAL BANKER IN IRAQ'
By: Michael F. Silva 2
By: Sophia R. Vicksman
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INTRODUCTION

As the world knows, in the spring of 2003, the United States and other
allied forces (the "Coalition") invaded the Republic of Iraq and toppled the
regime of Saddam Hussein. In doing so, the Coalition assumed control over and
responsibility for a country whose many problems included a virtually collapsed
banking system. Recognizing that a functioning banking system would be
important for Iraq's long term stability and prosperity, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (the "CPA"), headed by Ambassador Paul Bremer, established a team
of advisors to work with the Central Bank of Iraq, the state-owned banks, and
the private banks (the "Banking Team"). This article describes life as a member
of the Banking Team, reports on the Iraqi banking system, describes the new
Banking Law and Central Bank Law, and concludes with a commentary on
Iraq's future.
II. LIFE AS A COALITION ADVISOR IN IRAQ
The staff of the CPA is comprised of civilian and military personnel
who are assigned to staff units that in general mirror the different Iraqi
ministries (the Oil Ministry, the Justice Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the
Most of the members of the Banking Team are
Health Ministry, etc . . .).
commercial bankers who have been hired either by the Department of Defense
or by the Treasury Department's Office of Technical Assistance specifically to
work on the Coalition Staff. The Banking Team also includes full time Treasury
staff members and representatives from other government agencies and
instrumentalities, including the Federal Reserve and Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. In addition, there are representatives from the United Kingdom

1 The views and opinions expressed inthis article are solely those of the author and do not reflect
the views or opinions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, any other component of the Federal
Reserve, the Coalition Provisional Authority, or any component of the United States Government.
2 Michael F. Silva is Counsel and Vice President at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where
his primary responsibility is to provide legal support for the New York Federal Reserve account
relationships with foreign central banks. Michael served as a Federal Reserve representative on the
Coalition Provisional Authority staff in Baghdad from October 2003 to January 2004, during which
time he acted as an advisor to the Central Bank of Iraq. He is a 1992 graduate of Columbia Law
School and 1983 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.
3 Sophia R. Vicksman is Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where her areas of
expertise include central bank operations and payment systems. She is a 1995 graduate of
Georgetown University Law Center and a 1981 graduate of Tbilisi University in the Republic of
Georgia.
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(including the Bank of England), Poland,4 Australia, Canada and Italy. All
civilian CPA staff members are volunteers and most have signed up for three or
six month assignments.
Whatever your parent organization is, a deployment to Iraq as a CPA
staff member begins with a blizzard of paperwork and issuance of military travel
orders, an official government passport, and Kuwaiti visa. You also visit the
Pentagon for a series of shots and Fort Belvior, south of Washington D.C., to be
sized for military fatigues, helmet and body armor, receive a medical screening,
and be issued a military Combined Access / Geneva Convention Identification
Once you have completed your state-side processing, you fly
Card.
commercially to Kuwait City where you are met by CPA staff members and
driven to a Hilton Hotel right on the Gulf which the CPA utilizes as its "rear
area." The CPA has contracted a number of villas at the hotel which are used to
house CPA personnel while they receive their final processing before flying to
Baghdad. As is the case with virtually all CPA logistical support, the CPA rear
area in Kuwait is run by Kellogg, Brown and Root ("KBR"), a civilian
contractor which is a subsidiary of Halliburton.
Rear area processing generally takes two days and starts with the
issuance of the military equipment you were sized for in Washington plus a gas
mask, canteen, web belt, bed and a duffel bag to carry everything in. Next, you
receive yet another medical screening, gas mask training, and a briefing on
threats and security in Baghdad. The advice given includes helpful guidance
like "never pick up anything you did not drop because it might blow up" and
"always stay as flat as possible against the ground during a rocket or mortar
attack because most of the explosive force and shrapnel spreads upward and
outward from the impact site in V pattern."
After you have completed your rear area processing, you are scheduled
for a flight to Baghdad International Airport ("BHI") in a U.S. Air Force C-130
military transport. Military transport is currently the only way to fly to BHI
because the only civilian airline which was flying to BHI, Royal Jordanian
Airline's affiliate Royal Wings, suspended service after a DHL cargo aircraft
was hit by a missile in November of last year while operating out of BHI. You
travel by bus to the Kuwaiti air base that the C-130s depart from and in the
process you get your first experience with multiple layers of defense and
security checks that are a staple of life in Baghdad. Once your aircraft is ready
to receive you, you board and try to get as comfortable as you can sitting on top
of each other on web netting in a windowless aluminum tube that is deafening
loud and alternately roasting and freezing as you climb and descend. The arrival
at BHI can be quite memorable because the Air Force crews use a very steep,
maneuvering descent (not unlike an alpine skier cutting back and forth as he
descends steeply) to make themselves a more difficult target.
As you exit the aircraft, you are immediately struck by two things (at
least from May to October): the heat and the dust. Depending on the day, it can
4 As of this writing, the Banking Team is supervised by Marek Belka, a former Minister of Finance

for Poland who is currently serving as the CPA Director of Economic Development.
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feel like walking into a blast furnace. Compounding the heat is a very fine dust
hanging in the air. The dust in Iraq has the consistency of talcum powder and is
as easily stirred up. By the time you have claimed your luggage from the large
pile on a pallet that rode in with you on the C- 130 and loaded your luggage onto
the bus that will take you to the CPA's headquarters in Baghdad, you are
thoroughly sweaty and dusty and wondering how our troops ever fought in
conditions like this. As the bus departs the airport, you realize this will not be
an ordinary bus ride. The driver tells you to put your body armor and helmet on,
there are U.S. Army Humvees with machine guns escorting the bus front and
rear, and the whole procession drives at breakneck speed from the time it leaves
the security of the airport until it reaches the secure area around the CPA's
headquarters known as the "Green Zone".
The CPA utilizes one of Saddam's former palaces in the very center of
Baghdad on the west bank of the Tigris as its headquarters (the "Palace"). The
fact that many of the government buildings around the Palace were bombed into
rubble while the Palace was left untouched suggests that the Coalition planned
all along to use the Palace as its headquarters. The Palace is built of marble,
stone, and concrete and, until recently, was adorned with four huge busts of
Saddam looking down on the Palace grounds. The Palace grounds, which no
doubt used to be very lush and manicured, are now overgrown and unkempt and
filled with trailer camps which house the vast majority of the CPA staff. These
trailers are each surrounded by sandbag walls which protect them from all but a
direct hit on top by a rocket or mortar. There are also sandbag fighting positions
spread around the Palace grounds to defend against any "bad guys"' 5 that
infiltrate the Green Zone.
The interior of the Palace is largely marble. There is a large rotunda at
the main entrance, several dozen two and three room suites, and three very large
halls. The various CPA staff units, which, as stated above, largely mirror the
various Iraqi ministries (i.e., Oil, Finance, Health, Trade, Justice, etc . . .)

occupy the various suites. Of the three large halls, one now functions as the
CPA cafeteria, another has been turned into a 250 person dormitory, and the
third has been divided into dozens of plywood offices. There is only one kind of
light fixture in the Palace (chandeliers) and only one kind of plumbing fixture
(gold plated). Like the Palace grounds, the interior of the Palace has seen better
days. It is very crowded, there are computer network and power cables running
everywhere, and it has been gerrymandered by plywood walls installed to create
additional office space. The Palace is also a highly militarized environment.
Approximately half of the Palace staff consists of military personnel, most of
whom carry weapons at all time. In addition, a significant percentage of the
civilian staff carry weapons. Any "bad guys" who managed to gain access to
the Palace would be walking into a shooting gallery.

Between supporters of Saddam, disgruntled former members of the Iraqi Army, religious
extremists, and foreign terrorists, the mix of parties that attack Coalition forces is so diverse that the
CPA staff generally just refers to them with the catchall phrase "bad guys".
5
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There is no such thing as a typical day for a member of the CPA
Banking Team, but there is at least something resembling a typical schedule.
Most advisors generally arrive at the Banking Team's Palace office between 8
a.m. and 9 a.m. and start their day by checking for overnight e-mail from
Washington. Following that, on every day except Friday, which is the Muslim
Sabbath, most of the Banking Team departs the Green Zone for the specific Iraqi
entity that they advise: the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, one of the
state-owned banks, or the private commercial banks. While at these entities, the
various Banking Team members collectively work on a very large range of
matters, including assessing the financial condition of various institutions,
exchanging old currency for new (a major undertaking that was successfully
completed on February 15, 2004), restarting the check clearing system,
auctioning dollars for dinars to stabilize the value of the dinar, developing
monetary policies and mechanisms to implement that policy (including a
government securities market), developing an electronic funds transfer system,
training bank examiners, promoting modern banking practices, and cataloguing
Iraq's external debt. Banking Team members generally work at the Iraqi entities
that they advise until about 2 p.m., which is when the Central Bank, the stateowned banks and most other businesses close for the day. Most Banking Team
members usually arrive back at the Palace between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m. and the
first half of their work day is complete.
When they arrive back at the Palace, Banking Team members
sometimes run personal errands (like picking up laundry, checking for snail
mail, getting a haircut, cashing a check, and buying toothpaste) and return to the
Palace office about 4 p.m. to begin the second half of their day. 4 p.m. in Iraq is
8 a.m. on the east coast and Washington is beginning its day. Shortly thereafter,
the daily blizzard of questions, comments, suggestions, and instructions begins.
In between responding to these messages, Banking Team members try to do the
substantive work associated with their various projects. There is generally a
team meeting at some point each night to discuss that day's developments. Most
Banking Team members work until at least 10 p.m. and often until midnight or
later. They then head to their trailers for a few hours of sleep before rising and
starting it all over again, seven days a week.
Living conditions for the CPA civilian staff have always been much
better than living conditions for troops in the field and those troops deserve
tremendous respect and thanks for the privations they have endured. That said,
life in the Palace has not always been a bed of roses. The first wave of CPA
staff members who arrived at the Palace immediately after the invasion worked
and lived without air conditioning in temperatures that frequently reached 120
degrees or more during the day and rarely got below 90 degrees at night. They
slept on cots under mosquito netting, ate military rations, and bathed by pouring
bottles of drinking water on themselves. Fortunately, conditions in the Green
Zone have improved considerably in the year since the invasion. The Palace is
now air conditioned, as are the trailers where most CPA staff members sleep two
to a room in real beds. There is a laundry trailer where CPA staff members can
drop their laundry and get it back in two or three days, a post office trailer to
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receive and send snail mail, and even a well stocked "PX" to buy personal
incidentals.
As mentioned above, one of the large halls in the Palace has been
converted to a cafeteria that serves four meals a day complete with trays, plastic
utensils, and a choice of desserts. Other amenities in the Palace include a barber
shop for men, a beauty salon for women, a military finance office that cashes
checks, and a medical clinic. A hanger adjacent to the Palace which used to
house helicopters for use by Saddam has been converted into an excellent gym
with treadmills, exercise bikes, and weights. One advantage of living and
working in a federally designated war zone is that everything is free. Food,
housing, haircuts, laundry, transportation. All free. Even sending letters is free.
You just write "free mail" where the stamp would ordinarily go and drop it in
the mail slot. The only thing civilian CPA staff members pay for are personal
incidentals like shaving cream and toothpaste.
There are many unique challenges associated with working in Baghdad.
Chief among these are communication, transportation, and attacks by the bad
guys. Communications may be the most frustrating challenge faced by CPA
staff members. As of this writing, the Central Bank has only recently received
very limited phone service and only a small percentage of the branches of the
state-owned banks and private banks even have limited service. To talk to each
other, all of the CPA staff and a very limited number of Iraqi government
officials and private sector representatives rely on a local mobile phone network
established by the CPA which has mediocre coverage at best and is frequently
overwhelmed by volume. It does not take very much imagination to conceive
how difficult it is to run a country when simply trying to contact Iraqi officials
to schedule a meeting is a major production. While the CPA staff has a robust
e-mail system in the Palace, e-mail outside of the Green Zone is very limited
and is generally satellite based (which is slow and expensive). Many modem
banking practices - such as wire transfers, ATMs, and direct deposit - are of
course impossible in a stone age communications environment like this. Not
only that, but individual branches of the same state-owned bank often will not
even honor checks drawn on each other because they can not talk to each other
and confirm balances.
Transportation is a close second to communications in terms of
frustrating challenges faced by CPA staff members. Because of the threat of car
jackings, kidnappings, and roadside bombs, CPA staff members generally do not
travel outside the Green Zone without a security escort of some kind. If
requested to do so in advance, the U.S. military will supply an escort consisting
of two Humvees with mounted machine guns and five to eight heavily armed
troops to proceed and follow a Suburban carrying CPA staff members. The
whole procession is very impressive and no person with any hope of survival
would ever attack it. The problem is that the bad guys don't always care about
survival and the procession of firepower that is meant to deter the bad guys just
highlights the presence of a potential target. On top of that, all of the Suburbans
and most of the Humvees utilized to escort and transport CPA staff members are
"thinned skin", which means they have no armor plating and can be pierced by a
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reasonably high powered BB gun, much less an AK-47 round or improvised
explosive device. A final disadvantage of the U.S. military escort service is that
it must be arranged two full days in advance and can not easily accommodate
last minute changes in destination, desired arrival times, and numbers of persons
to be transported.
Because of the drawbacks of the military's escort services, a number of
the civilian contractors and foreign delegations working in Baghdad have
retained their own commercial security services. The Banking Team ultimately
retained the same commercial security service that the British government uses
to protect the U.K. members of the CPA staff. Comprised largely of former
members of the British Army, this service has an entirely different approach to
security. They use unmarked Landrovers which have heavy armor plating and
are much smaller than the Humvees and therefore do not get stuck in traffic on
the narrow Baghdad streets as often as Humvees do. The Landrover carrying
the "protectees" has a driver in the left front seat and a "shooter" in the right
front seat and is followed by a second Landrover which carries two more
"shooters" to defend the protectee vehicle if it comes under attack and to serve
as an escape vehicle if the protectee vehicle is disabled. All the escorts wear
plain clothes and keep their weapons concealed. Body armor is worn, but it has
to be blue or tan and not the camouflaged type the U.S. issues. The result is
much lower profile procession which attracts a lot less attention, has a better
chance of surviving an attack (because of the vehicle armor), and is better suited
to a rapid escape from the scene of an attack.
A final challenge faced by CPA personnel trying to work in a war zone
is war. Even car bombs which detonate at some distance from the Palace can be
clearly heard in the Palace and frequently create a very uncomfortable moment
of uncertainty as to what has just happened and what may be just about to
happen. The sound of automatic gunfire is also very common in Baghdad and
can likewise create uncomfortable moments of uncertainty. Gunfire can mean
anything from the imminent detonation of a large car bomb to an Iraqi who is
simply shooting into the air because he is either very angry or very happy.
Much to the disquiet of the CPA advisors to the Central Bank, the Iraqi guards
that protect the Central Bank have been known to use their AK-47s to shoot at
suspected shoplifters in the crowded market place across the street from the
Central Bank.
While the vast majority of attacks on Coalition forces have occurred
outside of the Green Zone, there have been numerous mortar and rocket attacks
against the Green Zone itself.
While these attacks are completely
inconsequential from a military perspective, they can still be very unsettling
from an individual perspective - especially if you happen to be caught outside
the Palace or sleeping in your tin-roofed trailer during one. Mortar and rocket
attacks on the Green Zone often occur between nightfall and midnight so that
the attackers can benefit from the cover of dark while still also benefiting from
sufficient traffic and other activity on the streets of Baghdad to disappear into.
Attacks typically consist of one to four mortars or rockets whose detonations can
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be remarkably loud even at a distance of several hundred yards. 6 One ironic
aspect of mortar or rocket attacks on the Green Zone is that they typically last
such a short period of time that the "Giant Voice" alert system installed by the
military to warn personnel about an attack often does not blow its siren and
audibly announce "Attack, Attack" in its loud androgynous voice until well after
the attack is over. Palace personnel generally take cover in the Palace basement
during attacks and sometimes have to spend as long as two hours there while the
military locates the launch site, confirms that another attack is not imminent, and
checks the Green Zone for any bad guys who may have infiltrated under the
cover of the attack.
While living and working in Baghdad is not easy, and can even be
hazardous at times, every CPA staff member would tell you that it is still very
satisfying to play even a small role in helping the Iraqi people to achieve peace,
stability, and prosperity.
IIl.

IRAQI BANKING INSTITUTIONS
a.

The Central Bank of Iraq

After the Green Zone, the Central Bank of Iraq (the "CBI") is probably
the second most fortified location in Baghdad. Located on Rasheed Street just a
few blocks east of the Tigris River, the CBI is situated in a compound
surrounded by a twenty foot-high barbed wire fence, sand-filled blast deflectors,
observation towers, and AK-47 toting Iraqi guards. Conveniently (especially in
light of the absence of phone service), the head offices of the two largest stateowned banks, Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank, are located in this same
compound. The CBI occupies three buildings in the compound, all of which
were stripped bare during the looting that occurred immediately after the
invasion. The completeness of the looting can not be overstated. Every single
piece of furniture, every single computer, every single piece of office
equipment, and every single office supply was taken. On top of the looting, all
of the CBI's below ground level space, including its vaults, was flooded when
the power was lost and the pumps that normally hold back ground water from
the Tigris stopped working. The end result of the looting and the flooding was a
dark, dreary, dirty building with bare concrete floors and walls that took months
to clean up and refurnish.
The CPA's efforts to resurrect and modernize the CBI swung into high
gear on July 7, 2003, when Ambassador Bremer issued an order that declared
the independence of the CBI from the government and prohibited the CBI from
financing the government.7 Things began to happen quickly thereafter.
6 Since the sound of a detonation is not always a reliable guide to its proximity, at one point the

Banking Team decided that a detonation would not be deemed "close" unless it shook the Banking
Team's Palace office sufficiently to displace dust from the light fixtures and plaster from the ceiling.
7 This order and almost all of the other assistance provided by the CPA to the CBI was orchestrated
by the lead and longest serving CPA advisor to the CBI, Simon Gray from the Bank of England.
Simon deserves tremendous credit for his Herculean and effective service as an advisor to the CBI.
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With the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, a new Central
Bank of Iraq Law was prepared that endowed the CBI with the powers and
responsibilities of a modem central bank.8 In furtherance of its monetary policy
responsibilities, in September of 2003, the CBI established a daily dinar / dollar
auction intended to stabilize the value of the Iraqi dinar (the "ID") by providing
a reliable and transparent supply of dollars in exchange for ID. Beginning with
total bids of just $20,000 when the auction was first established, the total value
of dollars sold at the daily auction now routinely exceeds $10 million and on
occasion has exceeded $20 million. During this period, the ID has appreciated
from an exchange rate of ID2300 per dollar to ID 1400 per dollar. Concurrently,
the CBI oversaw the exchange of approximately 5 trillion old dinars, bearing
Saddam's image, for new dinars through 240 exchange sites, mostly banks.
This exchange involved the equivalent of twenty-seven 747 plane loads of
currency that had to be distributed in the face of significant security risks. An
equal amount of old currency had to be gathered and destroyed.
At the same time that it was conducting the currency exchange, the CBI
was also soliciting and analyzing applications from foreign banks for Iraqi
banking licenses. Three foreign banks were ultimately selected for licenses:
Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, the National Bank of Kuwait, and
Standard Charter Bank. The introduction of these foreign banks into Iraq is
expected to result in a significant transfer of banking technology, modem
services, and best practices.
Another major effort by the CBI and its CPA advisors is to renew and
expand the collection of economic data, especially GDP and consumer price
statistics. The CBI, the Iraq Central Statistical Office, and various ministries all
collected such data during the previous regime, but the accuracy and
completeness of that data and the collection methods used to acquire it are
dubious at best. Significantly upgrading the accuracy and completeness of
economic data is one of the CPA's top economic priorities because of the
importance such data plays in formulating monetary policy and also in
qualifying for an IMF program. An IMF program will in turn be critical to the
resolution of Iraq's tremendous external debt, not so much because of the
disbursements that are likely to flow to Iraq under such a program as because an
among
IMF program is one of the requirements for a Paris Club agreement
9
debt.
Iraq's
reschedule
and
forgive
to
creditors
sovereign
Iraq's
8 The Central Bank ofIraq Law is discussed in greater detail below. While almost all of the CBI
Law was quickly prepared and agreed to, the resolution of a very few issues delayed issuance of the
law until March 6, 2004.
9 Estimates of Iraq's external debt vary, but it is most often thought to be approximately $120
billion. One of the Banking Team's top priorities is to accurately identify and reconcile such debt.
Whatever the exact amount of external debt is, it is clearly unsustainable and it is going to be
necessary for creditors to grant Iraq significant debt reduction. If Iraq's external debt is indeed in
the range of$120 billion, interest payments on that amount alone would equal about 37 percent of
Iraq's estimated 2004 GDP. According to Senior Director of Sovereigns at Fitch, James
McCormack, "Iraq's total external debt needs to fall approximately 90 percent to $14 billion for its
interest service burden to compare with the median for sovereigns rated B+ or lower by Fitch. Fitch:
Iraq's $120 billion debt unsustainable,AL-BAWABA NEWS, Feb. 26, 2004, available at 2004 WL
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The development of monetary policy for Iraq is one of the Banking
Team's greatest challenges. Not only is the economic data necessary for the
formulation of monetary policy largely absent, so is any significant mechanism
for implementing monetary policy. Currently the only tool the CBI has to
influence the supply of domestic money is its daily dollar auction. In the
absence of good inflation data, the foreign exchange rate is the only market price
that is indicative of inflation trends and the CBI's efforts to contain inflation are
limited to utilizing the daily auction to implement a managed float foreign
exchange policy. Clearly it would be desirable to have more monetary policy
tools at the CBI's disposal and the Banking Team is actively working to develop
a primary and secondary market for Iraqi government securities.
One of the major new responsibilities of the CBI is to operate and
manage the Development Fund for Iraq (the "DFI"), which was established at
the CBI by United Nations Securities Council Resolution 1483 ("UNSCR
1483") of May 22, 2003, to receive and hold international grants to Iraq and the
proceeds of Iraq's oil sales. As of this writing, more than $12 billion has been
deposited in the DFI and the DFI's current balance is approximately $8 billion.
Most of these funds are held in the CBI's DFI account at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, where they are immunized from attachment by a
Presidential Executive Order dated May 22, 2003. This Executive Order was
issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 1° to implement
the provisions of UNSCR 1483, which called for nations to prohibit attachment
of Iraqi oil proceeds, whether they have been deposited into the DFI yet or not,
and all DFI accounts. DFI assets held by the New York Federal Reserve are
currently disbursed to Iraq as directed by the CPA on behalf of the CBI, but, in
anticipation of the return of sovereignty to Iraq, operational control over the DFI
is in the process of being transferred to the CBI.
If all of the substantive challenges facing the CBI weren't daunting
enough, the CBI also faces daunting communication and information technology
challenges. As of this writing, a full year after the invasion, only a very limited
64571514.
'o50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") grants
the President sweeping powers over foreign assets to deal with "any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside of the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat." 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (a) (1977). The powers granted the
President under such circumstances include the authority to:
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent
or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power,
or privilege with respect to or, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof
has any interest. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1702 (a)(1)(B) (1977).
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the
President's authority under IEEPA to nullify interests in and attachments of foreign assets.
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amount of external phone service has just recently been restored to the CBI and
Likewise, the CBI has only recently
power disruptions are still common.
acquired a handful of computers and most of these are not networked. External
e-mail is available to less than a dozen persons and is satellite based, which is
expensive and slow. There has never been an electronic funds transfer system of
any kind in Iraq and the Banking Team is hard at work establishing a
rudimentary lap-top based system that will depend on satellite communications
and feature less than 100 terminals in a country with approximately 24 million
people. Most importantly, the CBI still has no SWIFT connection," which will
be critical to the CBI's ability to manage the letter of credit process associated
with Iraqi oil sales and also to manage the DFI funds on deposit with the New
York Fed.' 2
b. The State-Owned Banks 13
There are six state-owned banks in Iraq. They include the two largest
commercial banks: Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank, which together have a
market share of almost 90% and over 11,000 employees. In addition, there are
four special purpose banks: Real Estate Bank, Agriculture Bank, Industrial Bank
and the Socialist Bank. These banks were established for the purpose of lending
money for the specific purposes implicit in their respective names.
The state-owned banks were hit hard by the economic and financial
turmoil associated with the eight year war with Iran, the First Gulf War, the
twelve years of economic sanctions that followed the First Gulf War, and the
destruction and looting that occurred following the Coalition occupation in
2003. In addition, the financial condition of most bank customers was
significantly impacted and a large percentage of the loans on the books of the
state-owned banks are non-performing. While the banks are making efforts to
help customers restructure and reschedule past due amounts, these efforts are
complicated by the reluctance of many customers to service their debts because
they hope for a government bail-out at some point.
The state-owned banks are in an archaic state. Twelve years of
economic sanctions left bank technology in a rudimentary state and payment
systems in disarray. Any such systems that existed prior to the invasion were
11 SWIFT is the standard secure communication system used by central banks and large
commercial banks around the world to send authenticated messages to each other and effect
international funds transfers.
12 It is currently anticipated that the CBI will obtain a SWIFT connection in June. In the absence
of a CBI SWIFT connection, the New York Federal Reserve has facilitated communications between
the CBI and commercial banks which have issued letters of credit on behalf of purchasers of Iraqi
oil. As of this writing, the New York Federal Reserve has facilitated more than $8 billion worth of
Iraqi oil sales.
13 Most of the information contained in this article concerning any of the state-owned banks in Iraq
was drawn from a report prepared in December 2003 by Haydar AI-Uzri, the CPA's Senior Advisor
to Rafidain Bank. A copy of this report is on file with the author. This article specifically does not
include balance sheet information for the state-owned banks because the Banking Team is still
assessing their financial condition.
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destroyed and looted immediately after the invasion. Land-line telephone
systems are still largely inoperable, proving a major obstacle to any
modernization efforts. Satellite systems are now available, but their expense
limits their use. Checks take up to five days to clear within Baghdad and up to
three weeks in the rest of the country. Because banks have no way to confirm
balances with each other, customers are only able to cash checks which are
drawn on their own branch of the same bank. Credit cards and ATMs are
nonexistent. Even cash registers are uncommon.
For the most part, the state-owned banks only offer basic services.
These services include current and savings accounts, time deposits, short-term
overdraft and bills discounted facilities, short-term loans and advances, and bid,
advance payment, and performance bonds. Loans with a term over one year are
uncommon. Specialized lending is confined to the respective specialized banks;
real estate lending to the Real Estate Bank, industrial loans to the Industrial
Bank, agricultural loans to the Agricultural Bank and consumer loans to the
Socialist Bank. Credit analysis is limited almost entirely to appraising the value
of loan collateral. The overwhelming majority of loans are secured by real estate
and it is rare to lend more than 30% of the value of the collateral. Other than real
estate appraisal, the credit analysis process is very weak. Cash flow analysis is
virtually unknown.
Prior to the Coalition invasion, only state-owned banks could lend to
state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). However, the damage sustained by the SOEs
in post-invasion looting coupled with the questionable economic viability of
many of the SOEs to begin with, means that public sector debt on the books of
the state-owned banks is virtually all non-performing. Paradoxically, while the
banks' loan assets are virtually non-performing, bank liquidity is high. As the
introduction of the new dinar currency by the CPA drew closer, 14 it triggered a
tremendous growth in bank deposits. A substantial amount of these new
deposits are expected to remain within the system.
In addition to being heavily involved in SOE lending, the specialized
banks were heavily involved in lending to regime-related entities and persons.
In practice, at least in recent years, these banks have been conduits for special
loans to persons or companies favored by the former regime, especially in the
case of the Socialist Bank and the Industrial Bank; for loans on below market
terms for farmers and other agricultural businesses (the Agricultural Bank), and
housing loans on below market terms (the Estate Bank).
In an effort to kick start the Iraqi economy, the CPA has encouraged
Rafidain and Rasheed Banks to establish lending programs targeted at small and
medium enterprises ("SMEs"). Initially, loans made under the program were
limited to $50,000 with a maximum term of two years. The parameters of the
SME lending program were subsequently amended to increase the upper limit to
$250,000 and a maximum term of five years. Importantly, the credit approval
The CPA ordered and organized an exchange of old Iraqi dinars bearing Saddam's image for new
dinars from October 15, 2003 to January 15, 2004. "Saddam dinars" were no longer legal tender
after January 15, 2004.
14
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process was reduced from two months to two weeks. As of March 1, 2004,
Rafidain and Rasheed Banks had approved over 300 SME loans with a total
value of over $8 billion.
i.

Rafidain Bank

Iraq's largest bank, Rafidain Bank was founded in 1941. In 1964, the
offices of seven foreign banks operating in Iraq were nationalized and merged
into four state-owned Iraqi banks, one of which was Rafidain Bank. In 1971,
further consolidation reduced these four banks to just two, and subsequently, in
1974, Rafidain Bank became the country's only state-owned bank. In the 1970s,
Rafidain was among the top largest 100 banks in the world and was the premier
international bank in the region. But years of government directed activities and
under investments have dramatically degraded Rafidain's banking skills,
systems, and facilities.
Rafidain has 170 branches, 70 branches in Baghdad and 100 in the rest
of the country. It also has 10 branches in the autonomous area of Kurdistan,
which have operated independently from the head office since 1991. In
addition, Rafidain has 9 branches abroad in London (under liquidation),
Because online
Amman, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, and Sana'a.
communication and data transfer between the branches and head office are nonData is
existent, Rafidain's branches operate as independent unit banks.
physically transferred monthly by discs and figures are then aggregated. The
bank produces a consolidated balance sheet at the end of the year.
Among the many challenges Rafidain faces, two of the biggest are
rebuilding its operations domestically and resolving its huge foreign obligations.
The bank had been used by the government since the 1980s to finance its
growing budget and trade deficits. The Iraq-Iran war drained the government's
coffers and it utilized Rafidain's international reputation to raise funds in the
markets. The consecutive wars and the international sanctions left Rafidain
unable to meet these foreign obligations. Loans and trade obligations were
rescheduled, and still not serviced. Now Rafidain has foreign debt in excess of
$20 billion, almost all of which was incurred on behalf of the government. The
bank's assets are subject to attachment, and its branch in London is under
liquidation.
ii. Rasheed Bank
As just discussed, by the late 1980s, Iraq's war with Iran, trade deficits,
and growing state budgets had left Rafidain Bank heavily burdened with foreign
debt. In its effort to find a new source of financing, the government spun off a
new state-owned bank, Rasheed Bank, from Rafidain Bank in 1989. Almost half
of Rafidain's branches were utilized to form Rasheed Bank with an initial
capital of ID1 billion that was later increased to ID2 billion. The government
anticipated that by leaving all of Rafidain's debt with Rafidain while utilizing
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Rafidain's balance sheet to capitalize a new, debt free bank, the new bank would
be able to tap new international financing.
Rasheed Bank has 170 branches in Iraq and almost 7000 employees. It
also has 10 branches in autonomous Kurdistan that have been operating
independently from the main bank since the First Gulf War. Because of
communication difficulties, most Rasheed branches operate as independent unit
banks. Electronic communication and transfer of data between the head office
and its branches is nonexistent. Data is physically transferred by discs every
month when balance sheets are aggregated. As with Rafidain, many years of
government directed activities and under investment have left Rasheed Bank
with deteriorated banking systems and inadequate banking skills.
iii. The Estate Bank
The Estate Bank was established in 1948 to provide long-term home
construction loans. It began operations in 1949 with an initial paid-up capital of
IDI million, which was increased to IDI.1 billion in 1992. In 1996, its mandate,
together with the mandates of the other specialized banks, was broadened to
permit the same loans, advances, and investments which are permissible for
commercial banks. While the Estate Bank's permissible activities have been
expanded, its business remains predominantly in personal loans for housing and
it is estimated that such loans constitute 80% of the bank's loan portfolio. The
bank also makes loans for commercial building construction.
iv. The Socialist Bank
The Socialist Bank was established in 1990 to provide small and
medium sized loans to needy individuals, including government employees,
handicapped persons, widows, soldiers, and similarly situated persons. Its initial
paid-up capital was ID1 billion. Even though its mandate was broadened in
1996 to permit the same loans, advances, and investments which are permissible
for commercial banks, the bank's business continued to consist primarily of
personal loans.
Notwithstanding the bank's original charter, its business appears, at
least in recent years, to have been dominated by so-called "special loans" made
to individuals at the direction of the former government, funded from long term
loans to the bank by the Presidential Palace or the Central Bank. Based on
information provided by the bank, individual special loans appear to have been
substantially greater than those made in the ordinary course of its business. The
former were typically in excess of ID5 million (ranging up to ID 15 million)
while the latter are typically less than ID5,000 (and range down to as little as
ID500).
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v.

The Agriculture Cooperative Bank

The Agriculture Cooperative Bank was established in 1935 to provide
agriculture related lending services. The bank's main business involves the
acceptance of deposits from individuals, private sector and mixed companies,
and financial institutions, and lending for agriculture projects and other
activities. It has 42 branches. During the period from 2000 to 2002, the bank
was also used as an intermediary or agent of the former government to make low
interest, short to medium term medium sized loans to farmers to finance farming
equipment and to dig irrigation wells and channels. These loans were funded by
the Ministry of Finance and made to farmers selected by the Minister of
Irrigation or local governor.
vi. Industrial Bank of Iraq
The Industrial Bank of Iraq was established in 1935 to accept deposits
from individuals and companies and to mobilize the funds received for
investment in industrial projects and companies. The bank's main business is
the provision of current account and time deposit account for individuals, private
and mixed sector companies, and financial institutions; and lending to support
industrial projects and investing, including taking direct equity holdings, in
private and mixed private/state companies. The bank has a head office in
Baghdad, a branch in Baghdad and a branch in each of Basra, Mosul and
Hilla/Babylon. All five branches were badly looted following the Coalition
invasion and only one has reopened. With the exception of the Basra branch,
which was totally destroyed, the other branches are being restored.
c.

The Private Sector Banks' s

Following the First Gulf War and its economic consequences for the
state-owned banks, Saddam Hussein for the first time authorized the
establishment of banks that were not state-owned. The first of these "private
banks" was formed in 1992 and, as of March 2004, there are now seventeen
private banks in Iraq and two additional private banks are in the process of being
licensed.' 6 Fourteen of the private banks are headquartered in Baghdad, with
one each in Mosul, Arbil and Basra. Currently, these Private Banks operate 89
branches in Baghdad and 50 additional branches scattered throughout Iraq, but
few to the west of Baghdad. About fourteen branches have not been reopened.

1s Most of the information in this article on the private sector banks was drawn from a March 2004
report prepared by the CPA's lead and longest serving advisor to the private banks, Kevin G.
Woelflein. A copy of this report is on file with the author.
16 A complete list of the private banks operating in Iraq, plus contact information, can be found on
the CPA's web site, available at http://www.coalitioniraq.org. There is an eighteenth private bank
from the Kurdish area which is in the process of restructuring its balance sheet (which currently
reflects nothing but real estate holdings) to one which is more appropriate for a bank.
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The biggest challenge currently facing the private banks is a serious
shortage of capital. At the time the new Iraq Banking law was passed, none of
the private banks were within 50% of the minimum ID1O billion (roughly
equivalent to US$ 7.3 million at present exchange rates) capital required by the
Banking Law. The Banking Team has advised the private banks that the most
practical way for them to raise capital is to seek investment from stockholders or
foreign investors. The Banking Team has also advised the private banks to raise
more than minimum capital because they will soon be competing against new
100% owned foreign banks which will have minimum capital of ID 50 billion
(roughly equivalent to US$ 36 million at present exchange rates). More
importantly, these foreign banks will be able to support their Iraq financial
presence with the latest bank technology and current market experience and, if
needed, with additional capital.
Some of the private banks have indeed partnered with foreign banks.
The new Iraq Banking Law allows foreign investors to acquire up to 50% of an
existing Iraqi bank without going through the licensing procedure. The first
private bank to take advantage of foreign investment was the National Bank of
Iraq, which negotiated an investment transaction with the Export & Finance
Bank, headquartered in Amman, Jordan. Export & Finance Bank bought 49% of
National Bank of Iraq's equity for a multiple of book value in excess often, and,
in so doing, signaled that Iraqi private banks have significant franchise value.
The private banks have also sought to improve their competitive
position by seeking the revocation of the constraints placed on them by the
former regime. In October 2003, discussions with the CBI led to authorization
for all private banks to engage in international payments, remittances and letters
of credit. For the ordinary Iraqi, October 2003 marked the first time that they
were able to make an international payment since 1979. Re-entering the
international market also meant that Iraqi private banks could establish
correspondent accounts, particularly with the regional banks in the Middle East.
Once their capital is augmented, their branch network extended, and the
latest bank technology installed, many members of the Banking Team believe
that the private banks will be a very viable and attractive alternative to the stateowned banks. Many of the private bankers themselves believe the state-owned
banks have little competitive spirit and that it will be very difficult to get the
state-owned bank branches to cease acting independently as unit banks. In the
opinion of the private bankers, this condition has been fostered by the monopoly
on government deposits and the convenient opportunity to generate over 80% of
their earnings by investing in Iraqi Treasury bills. In addition, the former
regime destroyed the public's trust in the state-owned banks and a cash based
economy grew while state-owned banks became nothing more than payment
outlets for state welfare.
In the author's opinion, there is every possibility that in the future, most
Iraqis will choose a private bank over a state-owned bank and that the private
banks will become the core of Iraq's banking sector.
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IV. BANKING STATUTES
a.

The New Commercial Banking Law

The new Commercial Banking Law of Iraq (the "Banking Law") was
promulgated by Ambassador Bremer on September 19, 2003 by Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No. 40. The primary objectives of the law were to
establish a "safe, sound, competitive, and accessible banking system for the
purposes of providing a foundation for economic growth and the development of
as well as maintaining public confidence in the Iraqi
a stable Iraqi economy"
17
banking system.
The new Banking Law establishes a comprehensive banking system in
which the CBI plays the primary regulatory and supervisory role. The CBI's
important role begins with the bank licensing process. Pursuant to the new law,
no person or entity may engage in banking business in Iraq without a banking
license or permit issued by the CBI. 18 In fact, the word "bank" or its derivatives
may not be used in any language with respect to a business, product, or service,
without a license or permit from the CBI. 19
Establishing a bank in Iraq, including a majority or wholly-owned
subsidiary of a foreign bank, requires a "prior issuance of a banking license by
the CBI," and a banking permit is needed to establish a branch or a
representative office. 20 Banking licenses are issued only to properly registered
companies. Licenses and permits are issued for an indefinite time and specify
terms and conditions with which the bank or branch in question must
continuously comply. 21 Licenses are not transferable. 22 Where a new bank,
branch, or a representative office is sought to be established by a foreign bank, a
banking license or a permit may be issued only if the foreign bank is subject to
consolidated supervision in its home country.23
Importantly, the Banking Law guarantees that banks controlled,
partially or totally, by foreign persons, will be treated the same way as domestic
banks.24 Currently the number of licenses for banks controlled by foreigners is
limited to six; however, the Banking Law does not contemplate any limits to the
number of foreign-owned banks in Iraq after the end of 2008.25 Foreigners may
17 Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 40, Sec. 1 (2003), available at
http://www.coalitioniraq.org/regulations/20030924_CPAORD40.pdf. See also Banking Law of Iraq,
Art. 2 (2003), available at
http://www.coalitioniraq.org/regulations/20030924aCPAORD4OANNEX.pdf.
18 Banking Law of Iraq, Art. 3.1.
'9 Id. at Art. 3.4.
20Id. at Art. 4.1.
2 Id. at Art. 4.2.
22id
23Id. at Arts. 4.3-44.
24Id. at Art. 4.5.

Art. 4.6. As of this writing, there is some consideration being given to amending the
Banking Law to eliminate restrictions on the number of licenses issued to foreign banks all together.
At this time it is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty whether this amendment will be
made or not.
25Id. at
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also own up to 50% of an existing or new domestic bank.26 There are no
limitations for minority ownership by foreigners. Foreign banks must be subject
to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis in their home country
jurisdiction to be eligible to own any shares in a domestic Iraqi bank."
Just as a new bank may not open without first obtaining a license, an
existing bank may not voluntarily terminate its operations without first obtaining
the CBI's prior approval to do so in response to the request for revocation of its
license.28
The CBI may also revoke a banking license or permit which it
previously issued for reasons listed in Article 13 of the Banking Law, such as
where the license was obtained by using fraudulent statements; the license was
not used for twelve or more months; where the bank conducted its operations in
an unsafe or unsound manner; or where it violated a CBI order, to name just a
29
few.
The new Banking Law contains minimum capital requirements for
commercial banks. All domestic banks are required to maintain paid-in capital
of at least ID10 billion. 30 A bank cannot declare or pay to shareholders any
profit if such payment results in a reduction of its capital below the minimum
level. 31 In contrast, a subsidiary of a foreign-owned bank is required to maintain
ID50 billion of capital.32
Pursuant to the new Banking Law, the responsibility for conducting the
business and establishing the policy of a commercial bank in Iraq lies with the
bank's board of directors, which must consist of at least five members,
appointed for not more than four years (the board members may be subsequently
re-appointed for one more term). 33 The members of the board of directors must
"act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank," and
in carrying out their functions, they must "exercise the care, diligence and skill
that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable
circumstances. 34
The board of directors is required to appoint one of its members as the
authorized manager of the bank, "responsible for the implementation of the
decisions of the board of directors and for the management of the day-to-day
operations of the bank., 35 The authorized manager, as well as other board
26Banking Law of Iraq, Art. 4.7.
27
Id. at Art. 4.8.
2'id.at Art. 12.
29Id. at Art. 13. As of this writing, there is some consideration being given to amending the Banking
Law to move the license revocation procedure to the conservatorship / receivership portion of the
statute, discussed below. At this time it is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty
whether this amendment will be made or not.
30
Id. at Art. 14.1.
31 Id. at Art. 14.2.

32Id. at Art. 4.1. As of this writing, there is some consideration being given to amending the

Banking Law to require 1D50 billion in minimum capital for all banks, foreign and domestic. At this
time it is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty whether this amendment will be made
or not.
3 Id. at Art. 17.2
Id. at Art. 17.6.
3
Id. at Art. 18.1.
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members, members of the bank's audit committee, and designated branch
managers (referred to in the Banking Law as "administrators") must disclose
annually to the board of directors "any significant personal financial interests"
that they or a family member may have. a6 Importantly, prior
37 approval of the
CBI is required for appointing and removing an administrator.
Subject to the terms and conditions of its banking license, a commercial
bank in Iraq is authorized to provide a wide variety of financial services, such
as: (a) receive deposits; (b) extend credits; (c) buy and sell various money
market instruments, foreign currencies and precious metals, stocks, bonds, and
derivatives both for its own account and for the account of its customers; (d)
issue letters of credit and guarantees; (e) provide clearing and settlement
services; and (f) perform various other services, such as money brokering,
safekeeping, trust services, financial adviser services, and credit reference
services, and the like.3 8 Among activities prohibited to commercial banks are
business activities, such as participation in wholesale or retail trade,
manufacturing, transportation,
agriculture, mining, building, re-insurance, or
39
insurance underwriting.
In an attempt to control banks' risk exposures, the new Banking Law
contains prudential requirements as well as various limitations on extensions of
credit and bank investments. For example, an aggregate outstanding principal
amount of a bank's unsecured credit to any one person may not exceed 15% of
the bank's capital and reserves.40 An amount of fully secured credit, equal to up
to 20% of the bank's capital and reserves, may be added. 4'
The Banking Law also contains limitations on transactions with
affiliates and insiders, as well as investment restrictions. For example, banks
may not extend credit to a related person without approval of their board of
directors.42 In addition, credits to an administrator may not exceed 50% of the
administrator's annual salary, and more generally, the aggregate amount of
unsecured credit to all insiders may not exceed 10% of the bank's capital and
reserves.43 Loans to an insider are completely prohibited if they are granted on
terms that are "less favorable to the bank than the terms that are offered by the
bank to the public." 44 In addition, banks may not invest in stocks or other
equities in an amount that exceeds
20% of the bank's capital and reserves
4
without prior approval of the CBI. 1
In accordance with the Banking Law, all commercial banks are
required to keep on file proper documentation for every transaction for at least

36Banking Law of Iraq, Art. 21.1.
31Id. at Arts. 19-20.
3 Id. at Art. 27.1(a)-(k).
39
Id.at Art. 28.
40Id. at Art.30.1(a).
41Id.at Art. 30.2.
42
Id. at Art. 31. 1(a).
43Id. at Art. 31.1(b).
44Id.at Art. 31.1(c).
45
1 d. at Art. 33.1.
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seven years, 46 and must periodically furnish the CBI with financial statements
48
and annual reports.
In preparing their financial statements, the banks are
required to apply accounting rules in accordance with international accounting
standards (IAS). 49 The new Banking Law also contemplates the appointment of
an independent external auditor with qualifications and experience acceptable to
the CBI. The auditor may not be an owner, affiliate, employee, agent, or
representative of the bank for which the auditor is being appointed.
Each commercial bank in Iraq and its personnel, including any
administrator, officer, employee, agent, or auditor, is required to maintain
confidentiality of the customers' accounts, deposits, trusts, and safe deposit
boxes and may not provide any information without the customer's written
consent.5 1 Limited exceptions to this rule permit disclosure of information
pursuant to a court's decision or a public prosecutor's order,
as well as provision
52
of supervisory information to the CBI as required by law.
Under the Banking Law, the CBI performs bank supervision on a
consolidated basis. In carrying out its supervisory responsibilities, the CBI is
authorized to review commercial banks' statements, documents and other
information submitted by the banks, request any additional documents, and may
at any time cause an on-site examination of any bank. 3 The CBI is also
empowered to take enforcement actions and impose administrative penalties on
a commercial bank if evidence suggests that the bank has violated any provision
of the Banking Law, regulations, or a CBI order, or if the bank "conducted
unsafe or unsound banking operations. 54 Finally, the Banking Law governs
bankruptcy-related procedures involving commercial banks, such as
conservatorship,55 bank rehabilitation,56 liquidation,57 and receivership. 8

b. The New Central Bank of Iraq Law
The new Central Bank of Iraq Law ("CBI Law") was promulgated by
Ambassador Bremer on March 6, 2004 by Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 56 to establish a "safe, sound, and independent Central Bank for the
purposes of achieving and maintaining domestic price stability, fostering and

46Id. at Art. 38.1.
47Banking Law of Iraq, Art. 41, 43.1.
48Id. at Art. 45.
49Id at Art. 42.1(b).
50Id.at Art. 46.2.
5'Id. at Arts. 49-50.
52Id. at Arts. 49-51.
13 Id. at Arts. 53.1-53.3.
54 Id. at Art. 56. 1(a)-(b).
55
Id. at Sec. 11.
56Id.
at See. 12.
57
Id. at Sec. 13.
58Id. at Sec. 14.
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maintaining a stable and competitive market-based financial 5sstem, and
promoting sustainable growth, employment, and prosperity in Iraq."
Pursuant to the new CBI Law, the CBI, which was previously governed
by the old 1976 Central Bank of Iraq Law, is a legal entity with full legal
capacity to make contracts, to sue and be sued, and to carry out its functions
under relevant laws. In carrying out its functions, the CBI is empowered to hold
and administer property, hire staff and define their duties and compensation, and
determine and fund the CBI's budget. 60 To protect the autonomy of the CBI, the
CBI Law prohibits any person or entity from seeking to influence any member
or decision-making body of the CBI or from interfering in the activities of the
CBI. The CBI Law also bars the CBI from taking instructions from any person
or entity, including governmental entities. 6'
In achieving its objectives, the CBI is charged with performing
functions common for modern central banks. For example, the CBI's functions
include:
(a) formulating and implementing Iraq's monetary policy,
including exchange rate policy;
(b) holding and managing of all Iraqi foreign official reserves
and gold;
(c) acting as advisor and fiscal agent to Iraqi Government;
(d) issuing Iraqi currency;
(e) establishing and promoting an efficient payment system
in Iraq;
(f) issuing licenses and permits to commercial banks, acting
as bank regulator and supervisor, and providing liquidity
to Iraqi banks; and
(g) compiling and publishing data on Iraqi economy and Iraqi
banking and financial system.62
The CBI also has power to take any actions it deems necessary to combat
money-laundering and terrorist financing, as well as regulate and supervise nonbank financial institutions.63 For purposes of implementation of the CBI Law,
the CBI may issue regulations through a process involving public circulation of
a proposed draft for comments. 64 It may also issue legally binding orders
addressed to specific individuals or entities, as well as its own internal rules and
guidelines.65
59Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 56, Sec. 1 (2004), available at

http://www.coalitioniraq.org/regulations/20040308_CPAORD56.pdf See also CBI Law, Art. 3
(2004), available at
http://www.coalitioniraq.org/regulations/20040308_CPAORD56_AnnexA.pdf.
66o1CBI Law, Art. 2.1.
1d. at Art. 2.2.
62
1d. at Art. 4.1.
6

'

6

Id. at Art. 4.2.
Id. at Arts. 4.3-4.4.

6 Id. at Arts. 4.5-4.6.
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The capital stock of the CBI is wholly owned by the Government of
Iraq. The authorized capital of the CBI is ID100 billion. 66 The CBI stock is not
transferable, is not subject to encumbrance, and does not pay any dividend.67 In
the event of a shortfall in capital, the CBI's Board of Directors (the "Board") in
consultation with the Minister of Finance may request the Iraqi Legislature to
approve a capital contribution to the CBI by the State.68
The responsibility for carrying out the CBI's functions lies with the
CBI Board, consisting of nine members, including CBI's Governor, two Deputy
Governors, three Senior Managers, and three other individuals "with suitable
monetary, banking or legal expertise" who have not been employed by the CBI
within one year preceding their nomination to the Board. 69 The Governor of the
CBI serves as the chairman of the Board. 70 Every Board member must be an
Iraqi citizen, "a fit and proper person," and must hold a university degree or
have "extensive professional experience in a field related to banking, economics,
finance, commerce, or law.'
During their tenure, Board members may not hold any employment
other than with the CBI, except that they may engage in a limited lecturing and
other unpaid academic activity. 72 The outside employment prohibition includes
public service as well as service in any capacity at any entity supervised by the
CBI. 73 The prohibition of outside employment with the exception of limited
teaching also applies to all CBI employees.74
Upon their appointment to the Board and annually thereafter, each
Board member must disclose in writing any direct and indirect business interests
that he or a family member may have; the Board submits such declarations to
the Minister of Finance and the Appointing Authority.75 After departing from
the CBI, former CBI Governor, Deputy Governor, or chief internal auditor may
not serve or represent another bank or entity supervised by the CBI. The Board
may establish compensation for its former members.76
During their service or employment at the CBI, Board members and
employees of the CBI may not receive credit from any institution supervised by
the CBI. Similarly, neither Board members nor employees of the CBI may
accept any gift or credit if the acceptance would result, or give appearance of
resulting,
"in diminishing [their] impartial devotion to [their] duties to the
,,77
CBI.

66Id. at
67

Art. 5.1.
CB1 Law, Art. 5.2.
6' Id. at Art. 9.
69
1d. at Art. 11.
7

0Id. at Art. 1 (a).

71 Id. at Arts. 12.1-12.2(a), (b).

72Id. at Art. 12.3(a).
7"

Id. at Art. 12.3(b).

4 Id. at Art. 21.4.

75
76 Id.

at Art. 15.1.
Id. at Art. 15.3.
IId. at Arts. 21.1, 21.5.
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A Board member may resign from office after giving one month's
notice. However, if the Appointing Authority does not accept resignation, the
Board member may be required to continue serving for up to three months. A
member of the Board may be removed from the office by the Appointing
Authority if the Board member has been: (a) convicted of a crime; (b) declared
bankrupt; (c) found guilty of a conduct involving "lack of probity in financial
matters or other serious misconduct;" (d) disqualified or suspended from
practicing a profession; (e) declared unfit to manage a company; (f) found to
have violated provisions of the CBI law related to the disclosure of interests or
prohibition of outside employment; (g) is suffering from a medical condition
that, in the opinion of the Appointing Authority, renders him unfit for the
position; or (h) has been absent from meetings of the Board for more than three
months without Board's approval.78 The Board member may not be removed,
however, without an opportunity for a hearing before the Appointing Authority,
and a decision to remove a Board member may be appealed to the Court of
Appeal.79
In accordance with the CBI Law, the CBI Board meets upon the
initiative of its chairman or the initiative of at least one-third of its members, but
at least once a month. 80 A quorum for the Board's meetings is required and
decisions of the Board are adopted by simple majority. 81 The Governor, as chief
executive of the Board, is responsible for the implementation of the Board's
decisions.82
The CBI Law provides for immunity from legal action for the CBI's
Board members, agents, and employees. Such persons are not liable in damages
for any act or omission taken in discharge of their official duties that were
within the scope of their employment. Moreover, the CBI must indemnify its
Board, agents and employees against any legal costs incurred in the defense
against any legal action brought against them in connection with
83 the discharge
of their official functions within the scope of their employment.
As Iraq's central bank, the CBI is authorized to hold accounts of the
Iraqi Government and act as the Government's fiscal agent in domestic and
foreign borrowing. 4 The CBI also may, with Government permission, represent
the Iraqi Government in negotiations with foreign countries and international
institutions on monetary and financial issues, and perform financial operations
for the Government based on agreements arising out of international financial
arrangements concluded by the Iraqi Government.8 5 The CBI is specifically
prohibited from lending to the Government. 6
78CBI Law, Art. 14.2(a)-(i).

'9 Id. at Arts. 14.3, 14.4(a)-(b).
80
81 Id. at Art. 17.
Id. at Arts. 18-19.
88'3Id. at

Art. 20.
Id. at Art. 23.

84Id. at Art. 25.1(a)-(b).
85Id. at Art. 25.1(c)-(d).
Sid. at Art. 26.1.
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In managing Iraq's official foreign reserves, the CBI, consistent with
international best practices, may invest such reserves in monetary gold held in
its vaults, foreign currencies, credit balances payable on demand in foreign
currencies, special drawing rights held in Iraq's account in the International
Monetary Fund, and in any readily-marketable securities issued by, or bearing
the full faith and credit of, foreign governments, central banks, and international
financial institutions.87
In order to implement monetary policy, the CBI is authorized to
perform open market operations, such as: (a) purchasing and selling, either
outright or under repurchase agreements, debt securities issued by the CBI or by
the Iraqi Government in the secondary market, (b) purchasing and selling
foreign exchange, (c) "discounting bills of exchange or promissory notes," (d)
making loans that are fully secured by collateral, and (e) "accepting interestbearing deposits from banks." 88 The CBI may also require that commercial
banks maintain reserves with the CBI, imposing penalties for failure to maintain
such reserves, as well as for overdrafts on the reserve accounts. 89 In exceptional
circumstances, the CBI may act as lender of last resort.90
The CBI has the exclusive right to issue Iraqi national currency - the
92
dinar. 9 1 Banknotes issued by the CBI are a first charge on the CBI's assets.
Several provisions of the CBI Law deal with currency in more detail, including
Article 37, which provides for freedom of currency in Iraq. In addition, the CBI
law contains a separate section that provides for various criminal offenses
dealing with counterfeiting. 93
Among CBI's functions are establishment and maintenance of safe and
efficient payment systems for clearing and settlement of payment transactions in
accordance with international standards and best practices. 94 To this end, the
CBI may take such actions as it deems necessary to carry out its tasks. The CBI
also has the exclusive authority to license, regulate and supervise banks and
95
their subsidiaries to ensure compliance with the CBI Law and Banking Law.
This includes the authority to conduct on-site examinations and off-site
surveillance, as well as the authority to require the provision of information.96
The CBI is also empowered to take remedial actions with respect to banks and
their subsidiaries, and to enforce compliance with relevant laws and
regulations. 97 Moreover, the CBI may, upon obtaining a warrant, enter the
offices and examine books and accounts of any person or institution if the CBI
has reasonable grounds to suspect that such institution engages in an activity that
87CBI Law, Art. 27.
8

Id. at Art. 28(a)-(e).

891d. at Art.29.
90Id. at Art. 30.
9'Id. at Art. 3 1.

9'Id.at Art. 32.
93
Id.at Arts. 49-62.
94Id.at Art. 39.1.
95Id. at Art. 40.
96id.
97id.
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is subject to CBI's jurisdiction without the appropriate license or permit, and
upon determination that such activity has indeed98 taken place, the CBI may order
such person or institution to cease such activity.
Finally, the CBI Law establishes a Financial Services Tribunal
("Tribunal") which is empowered to review the decisions and orders of the CBI
that:
(a) reject an application for a banking license or permit,
attach a condition to such license or permit, or revoke a
license or permit;
(b) impose enforcement measures or administrative penalties
under the Banking Law;
(c) enjoin a person engaged in unlicensed activity under the
CBI Law; and
(d) extend the term of a conservator, and99more generally, take
actions provided for in the Banking Law.
In addition, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over any dispute between banks and/or
financial institutions if agreements between such banks and/or financial
institutions provide for resolution of disputes by the Tribunal.100 Importantly,
however, the Tribunal may not review CBI's decisions or actions concerning
or implementation of monetary policy, including exchange rate
development
1
policy. ''
The Tribunal is composed of one or more panels of three to five judges,
and is headed by a chief judge, appointed by the Minister of Justice. 0 2 The
chief judge selects judges from a pool of judges, which is comprised of five
judges.'0 3 Three of them must be professional lawyers, and are appointed by the
Minister of Justice. ° 4 The remaining two judges are appointed by the Minister
of Finance; one of them must be an experienced accountant, and the other must
have extensive professional experience in financial transactions. 15 Judges on
the Tribunal may serve full or part-time.1°6 Detailed rules apply to the
qualifications required for appointment of judges on the Tribunal, including
their employment outside the Tribunal, to rule out any conflicts of interest.']0
Judges are appointed for a ten-year term, but may resign upon notice; they may
not be removed without a hearing before the Minister of Justice.108

98Id. at Art. 42.
99CBI Law, Art. 63.1(a)-(d).
'ooId. at Art. 63.3.
'o, Id. at Art. 63.4.
102Id. at Art. 64.1.
103Id. at Arts. 64.1, 64.2.
'04id. at Art. 64.2.
105Id.
'06Id. at Art. 64.4.
'07Id. at Art. 64.5.
'08 Id. at Arts. 64.6, 64.7.
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Tribunal proceedings are to be governed by regulations issued by the
Minister of Justice. 109 Decisions of the Tribunal are taken by a majority of the
judges and must be recorded." 0 Final decisions and orders of the Tribunal are
subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal.'
V. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
The author believes that Iraq's banking sector has significant potential
to become a modem, sound, effective banking system that promotes economic
activity and stability in Iraq. The CBI officials, state-owned bank officers, and
private bankers that the author came in contact with were uniformly well
educated, experienced, and motivated to contribute to a stable and prosperous
Iraq. Another fact that bodes well for the Iraqi banking sector is that the Iraqi
people are anxious to have a safer and more productive place to keep their
money than under their mattresses and also are anxious to have a reliable source
of capital to start new businesses or expand existing ones with. While the Iraqi
banking sector is particularly deficient in information technology, it is eager to
embrace it and such technology should rapidly take root once the basic
essentials of phone service and reliable power supplies are established.
The biggest obstacle preventing the Iraqi banking sector from realizing
its potential is the same obstacle that prevents all of Iraqi society from realizing
its potential: security. As long as people are dying in the streets, the survivors
will be reluctant to put money into banks, businesses will be reluctant to take out
loans, banks will be reluctant to make loans, and those loans that are made will
be less likely to perform. An additional consequence of security concerns is that
the foreign banks which have been licensed to operate in Iraq are unlikely to do
so until they are convinced they can do so safely, thereby depriving Iraq 2of
much needed capital, modem banking practices, and information technology."
If the biggest obstacle preventing the Iraqi banking sector from
realizing its potential is security, the next logical question is what will it take to
achieve security. In the author's opinion, the determining factor as to whether
there will be security in Iraq is the United States' willingness to commit military
forces in sufficient numbers and for a sufficient period of time to achieve three
objectives. First, prevent foreign terrorists from entering Iraq in numbers large
enough to achieve their goal of destabilizing society and turning Iraq into a
haven for terrorism. Second, prevent Saddam loyalists and Baathists from
becoming sufficiently organized and well armed to terrorize and intimidate the
population into restoring them to power. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
prevent religious and tribal militia from building up to the point where they are
capable of organized, coordinated attacks as opposed to low intensity
harassment of Coalition forces and opposing militia. The author believes that
109

d. at Art. 66.

' 10 1d at Art. 68.1.
1 Id. at Art. 70.1.
112 As of this writing, none of the foreign banks, which have been licensed to operate in Iraq, have
actually started to do so because of security concerns.
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achieving these objectives will take at least three to five years 113 and involve
armed confrontation of sufficient intensity and frequency to produce, over the
course of several years, at least several hundred U.S. casualties; maybe even
several thousand. The United States' willingness to pay this price will be the
single most important influence on how safe and stable Iraq becomes for the 24
million people who live there.
Just as providing security is the single most critical task for the United
States, the Iraqis also have a single most critical task that they must perform in
order for Iraq to be successful: they have to learn to compromise with each
other. This will be no small challenge. As the world knows, Iraq is a mosaic of
ethnic, tribal, and religious factions which have never lived at peace with each
other except under the boot of a brutal dictator. However, if the Iraqis are lucky,
the horrific pain and suffering they experienced under that brutal dictator will
motivate them to compromise with each other over political power, religion, and
resources in order to achieve the peace, stability, and prosperity they have so
long sought and richly deserve. The author's impression of Iraqi society is that
there are enough moderate voices within each faction that are tired of death and
privation to form at least a plausible basis for compromise among the factions.
But the United States has to provide an environment that is secure enough for
those voices to emerge from the shadows they are currently hunkered down in.
It all comes down to security and compromise. If either is not
achieved, game over. Iraq will make Afghanistan under the Taliban look like a
nursery school playground. However, if the United States does provide security,
and if the Iraqis do learn to compromise with each other, then it is likely that
Iraq and its huge oil reserves will join Germany, Japan, and South Korea as
countries that were once occupied by the United States that subsequently went
on to success. It may be less democratic than we might like, it may be more
religious than we might like, it may be less tolerant than we might like, it may
not be as wealthy as the Iraqis would like, and it may be more violent than
anyone would like, but it should be sufficiently democratic, secular, tolerant,
prosperous, and safe to be a stabilizing and influential model of a successful
Arab society.

" The military occupation of Germany following World War I1lasted four years and the occupation

of Japan lasted seven years.
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